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Our effort to understand crime rate change is hampered by governmental thinking 
about crime, and the vested interest governments have in favourable (popular) 
outcomes. At least as practised in the United Kingdom, thinking about burglary often 
assumes a ‘top-down’ approach, placing most of the drivers of crime rate change in 
the hands of government; while reducing private citizens to passive, isolated 
individuals, and civil society and its institutions to a wasteland devoid of intention, 
morality and purpose (Hope and Karstedt, 2003). Not surprisingly, the increasing use 
of crime statistics as a source for governmental performance measurement (Matrix 
and Hope, 2006) tends to reinforce government’s own self-image that it has (or ought 
to have) the dominant influence over society’s crime (Garland, 2001) 2. Because of 
this, governments find it difficult to come up with narratives to explain the changes in 
crime rates observed in their own national statistics: reluctant to take responsibility 
when crime goes up, at a loss to explain why it goes down. Part of their difficulty rests 
in failing to acknowledge sufficiently the active role played by private citizens and 
civil institutions within society (Hope and Karstedt, 2003). This paper, which tries to 
account for the trend in burglary in England and Wales since the start of the 1980s, 
attempts to correct the balance somewhat, weighing the governmental perspective 
against a more ‘market-oriented’ or ‘civil society’ perspective. 
 
Understanding the trend in burglary 
 
A considerable effort has been put into modelling the post-war recorded crime trend 
of residential burglary in England and Wales. Simon Field’s influential analysis 
introduced a number of innovations in the study of historical crime dynamics and their 
relationship to economic and demographic variables (Field, 1990), including use of a 
wider range of economic indicators than hitherto (which had tended to focus primarily 
upon gross unemployment rates), in particular, measures of personal consumption; 
and in seeking to model both long-run and short-run change dynamics. Subsequently, 
Field (1999) produced a revised ‘equilibrium model’, explaining long-run trends in 
terms of the stock of crime opportunities (represented by real consumer expenditure) 
and the number of young males (presumably proxying a supply of potential 
offenders). Short-run growth in burglary appeared to be self-correcting towards the 
                                                 
2 Thus, Home Office Public Service Agreement 1 (PSA1) is “…to reduce crime by 15% and further in 
high crime areas” (HM Treasury, 2004). 
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equilibrium trend, while rapid short-run consumption growth tended to depress 
property crime growth, and vice versa. 
 
Much of the post war period had seen sustained growth in the rate of residential 
burglary, and the model appeared to produce a good fit to the trend, at least while 
growth continued (Field (1999; Dhiri et al., 1999). Consequently, Figure 1 illustrates 
forecasts predicting a 26 per cent rise in burglary for the period 1998 to 2001 (Dhiri et 
al., 1999). Unfortunately, Figure 2 shows that the opposite happened – residential 
burglary recorded by the police declined by around 20 per cent (Walker et al., 2006, 
Table 2.04) during this specific period and, since 1995, there has been a 62 per cent 
decline in burglary reported to the British Crime Survey (Walker et al., 2006, Table 
2.04).  
 
Figures 1 and 2 here 
 
Broadly, there are two possibilities to account for this dramatic change of events. In 
the first place, the reversal of predictions could have been due to the effect of 
government policy. Neither the long run nor the short-run models are able to 
incorporate specific, programmatic crime prevention interventions: the former 
because the time-span is too long, the latter because it is too short. The duration of 
government programmes – a matter of two to three years – makes of them ‘semi-
fixed’ effects, whose ‘intensity of impact’ is difficult to measure or model3. During 
the 1990s, Government attempted programmes of targeted burglary reduction, aimed 
specifically at reducing so-called ‘repeat victimisation’. In 1998, the Government 
launched its Crime Reduction Programme, which ostensibly ran until 2003, a 
substantial component of which was its Reducing Burglary Initiative. Nevertheless, 
evidence is presented in this paper suggesting that these programmes, despite 
unprecedented investment and coincidental reductions in burglary, probably have had 
a negligible impact, in themselves, on the general reduction in burglary that has 
occurred.  
 
                                                 
3 For a discussion see Hope et al., 2004. 
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The second possibility is that the models are wrong or at least no longer appropriate. 
Of course, burglary rates have been falling in the last decade in many countries 
comparable to England and Wales, which suggests that specific government 
programmes cannot have had an impact by themselves. Yet be that as it may, this does 
not undermine the possibility of any governmental action, since the timing of onset of 
the reduction varies between countries (and started in the USA in the mid-1970s), and 
that all states maintain criminal justice systems that constantly intervene in crime 
(albeit with uncertain and haphazard effects). Attribution of cause remains extremely 
difficult. 
 
Nevertheless, various technical deficiencies of the models have been observed which 
provide some clues for explanation. In the first place, Deadman’s updated and revised 
model of the post war property crime trend finds that the long-term model (including 
the assumptions of error-correction and equilibrium process) are more deficient in 
their predictive power than is the short-run model – that is, short-run change is more 
predictive over the long-run (because it is more predictive of the short-run) than a 
forecast specifically modelled on the long-run (Deadman, 2003). Second, Ormerod et 
al., (2003) argue cogently for non-linear models of crime rates, though the most 
appropriate form and specification of these remains unresolved, requiring perhaps a 
greater attention to social and criminological theory than is customary amongst 
economists (see Marris, 2003). Finally, Osborn (1995) identifies a ‘ratchet effect’ of 
short-run change over the longer-term trend – the trend being asymmetric such that 
increases (or decreases) in the trend do not lead to commensurate reversals, at least 
that would be consistent with a fully equilibrating model. In this respect, Hale (1998) 
also identified a number of epochal step-changes in the post war property crime trend 
relating to step-changes in economy and demography. In sum, not only have doubts 
arisen about validity, especially of the long run, linear, equilibrium model, but the 
nature of these doubts, it will be suggested below, provides some clues as to the 
factors that influence the trend in burglary in England and Wales, and how they might 
be conceptualised. 
 
Targeted governmental action 
 
The stimulus for governmental action to reduce burglary since the 1990s comes from 
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a seminal paper by Trickett et al. (1992; see also Trickett et al., 1995a) which 
introduced a novel way of conceptualising crime victimisation rates based upon the 
British Crime Survey. Figure 3, calculated from BCS data (see Hope, 2001 for 
details), illustrates the distribution of two household property crime victimisation 
rates4: 
1. The incidence rate – that is, the per capita number of household crime 
victimisation incidents within samples from each PSU. In Figure 1, these 
PSUs are ranked according to deciles (from low to high) and the average 
crime incidence rate computed for each decile. 
2. The prevalence rate – that is, the proportion of the PSU samples that 
experienced one or more victimisation incidents, again computed as decile 
means. 
From these two rates, a third can be computed: 
3. The concentration rate – that is, the number of crime victimisation 
incidents per victim. 
These rates are related arithmetically (Trickett et al., 1992)5. The distribution of 
household property crime victimisation incidence rates in Figure 3 has also been 
modelled statistically from micro-level household and area-contextual data (Osborn 
and Tseloni, 1998) providing powerful support for the hypothesis that the distribution 
observed in Figure 1 represents the distribution of crime victimisation across the 
population. Consequently, it was hypothesised that a substantive, non-random 
relationship might underlie the arithmetic relationship observed between the three 
crime rates – a combinational process termed crime-flux (Barr and Pease, 1992).  
 
This conceptual apparatus promised both to provide a basis for evaluating hypotheses 
about empirical change in crime victimisation (Hope, 1995) and new insights into the 
distribution of crime victimisation between constituent communities within the 
general population (Farrell et al., 1996). The shape of the distribution (in Figure 3) 
appears to suggest that if resources could be concentrated on high crime areas, this 
would lead to greater reductions, relative to effort, in the national crime rate (Pease, 
                                                 
4 Household property crime includes: burglary, theft from dwelling, and criminal damage to property 
associated with the dwelling, its contents or grounds. 
5 If the number of victims = V, the size of the population = P and the count of the number of 
victimisation incidents = C; then: Prevalence = V/P; Concentration = C/V; and Incidence = (V/P) x 
(C/V).    
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1993). Further, since the crime concentration rate appears to exert a disproportionate 
influence on the crime (incidence) rate, especially in the highest crime areas, then 
efforts to affect concentration in these areas might achieve an even greater efficiency 
gain in reducing the national average. Similarly, since it seems that in most areas there 
are fewer victims than would be expected if crime victimisation was randomly 
distributed amongst their populations (Trickett et al., 1992), then concentrating effort 
on those fewer number of victims upon whom victimisation appears to be 
concentrated – so-called ‘repeat victims’ – would produce yet more efficiency gain 
for prevention effort (Farrell and Pease, 1993). Extrapolating the cross-sectional 
distribution to a dynamic form, suggests that changes in concentration rates may exert 
an influence on the level of the crime incidence rate. Consequently, micro-level 
targeting of crime prevention on repeat victimisation prevalence would bring about 
macro-level change in crime concentration rates (Laycock, 2001; Pease, 1993). This 
hypothesis has been advanced in policy-making not only through individual 
prevention projects (Farrell, 2005) but, since circa 1995, by also inserting the goal of 
reducing repeat victimisation into national police performance management in 
England and Wales (Laycock, 2001).  
 
Nevertheless, while the burglary victimisation rate rose to a peak in the mid-1990s, 
and has fallen subsequently, Figure 4 suggests that changes in the national crime 
victimisation rate may have been driven chiefly by changes in prevalence rather than 
concentration. During the period, the rate of crime concentration has remained 
relatively stable, apparently exerting a negligible influence on the trend in the crime 
incidence rate.  
 
Figures 3 and 4 about here 
 
As a characteristic of a crime trend, the concept of crime-flux remains something of 
an enigma. It remains the case that victims are relatively rare amongst the general 
population at any one time; and repeat victims are even rarer. If the absolute number 
of repeat victims in a population is also dependent upon the total number of victims, 
then the smaller the latter, the lower the prevalence of repeat victims in the 
population, and hence the less of a contribution they could make to the incidence rate 
(that is, via the concentration rate). So, given the observed relationship between the 
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two rates (Figure 1, see also Osborn and Tseloni, 1998), for the incidence rate to be 
determined by the concentration rate, a decline in the concentration (frequency) rate 
of victimisation would have to be substantial to overtake the effect of a reduction in 
the prevalence (exposure) rate, since the latter is simultaneously reducing the (small) 
number of victims who would be exposed to further victimisation. Although it has 
been possible to observe variant patterns of crime-flux in local survey data (Hope, 
1995; 2002), at the national-level, Figure 4 suggests a more stable pattern; with the 
concentration rate remaining relatively constant while the incidence rate appears to be 
driven by prevalence. In sum, the role of repeat victimisation in driving crime rates 
via the concentration rate remains questionable. Still, whatever the reality of repeat 
victimisation, the BCS has registered a substantial decline in household property 
crime that seems to have occurred notwithstanding the crime concentration rate, nor 
the apparent policy effort put in to address it. 
 
Reflexive securitization 
 
Given the apparent failure of a directly-targeted burglary reduction approach, some 
other explanation of the observed reduction in burglary is needed, preferably one that 
overcomes the deficiencies of the governmental explanations; that is, a revised model 
that could account for the failure of previous models (discussed above) to anticipate 
the reduction in crime, that also emphasises the role played by the prevalence rate.  
In England and Wales, burglary is, first and foremost, an offence of trespass (a 
violation of private property rights), and only consequentially an offence of theft or 
damage (or in its aggravated form, of violence)6. Table 1 suggests that the 
contemporary profile of burglary gained from the British Crime Survey comprises two 
roughly equally-sized forms of the offence, together accounting for just under 90 per 
cent of the BCS total estimate: first, With-Loss Burglary – that is, burglaries involving 
the theft of property; and second, Attempted Burglary – where entry was not effected 
to the dwelling7. The period 1981-1991, which saw a spectacular increase of 84 per 
cent in total burglary during the 1980s, was accompanied by only a modest rise in the 
proportion of With-Loss Burglary and no change in the proportion of Attempts. 
                                                 
6 Trespass is the defining characteristic of the offence in England and Wales; the Theft Act, 1968, 
abolished the need for evidence of ‘forced entry’. 
7 This distinction says nothing as to the motives behind so-called ‘attempted burglaries’. A residuum, 
around 10 per cent, consists of with-entry burglaries where no property was stolen. 
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Conversely, the period 1991-2003/04 saw a marked decline in burglary of 46 per cent, 
which was accompanied by a decline in the proportion of With-Loss Burglary of 
around 14 per cent, and an increase of 18 per cent in the proportion of Attempted 
Burglaries. Therefore, while the increase in burglary over the 1980s would seem to 
have been a continuation of the general profile of the offence, which may have 
persisted in the past, the period since the mid-1990s – which has seen a reduction in 
burglary - has been accompanied by a qualitative change in the composition of 
burglary in England and Wales. It seems plausible to infer that this qualitative change 
is an indicator of a diminishing return for offenders from burglary (reflected in the 
declining number of burglaries committed), resulting from an increase in the failure 
rate of burglary  – a greater and related likelihood of failure both of initial trespass 
and subsequent theft. Equally plausible is that this change has much to do with an 
increase in the relative security of property. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Both van Dijk (1994) and Philipson and Posner (1996) propose essentially similar 
variants of a general process of reflexive securitization. At any one time, a crime rate 
is an aggregate outcome of a multitude of individual transactions between populations 
of offenders and victims. Since both populations interact and react to each others’ 
actions, the general form of a crime rate trend is likely to follow that of a cycle of 
‘boom and bust’: first, as with conventional criminological explanations, crime rates 
may rise primarily due to the actions of offenders - opportunities for crime may 
increase, or costs of committing crimes diminish, or rewards from conformity may 
seem less attractive, etc. – leading to the increasing victimisation of citizens. 
Essentially, the source of these influences is exogenous to the model (i.e. exogenous 
to the interaction between offenders and victims) reflecting changes in economy and 
society, playing through into socially structured incentives for deviance or conformity 
bearing both upon the standing motivation and the contingent offence-structuring 
decision-making of offenders. Secondly, however, citizens respond by taking private 
security actions to avoid or protect themselves from crime risk, for example, by not 
visiting city centres in their cars, target hardening their homes, joining-in with their 
neighbours in mutual surveillance, or moving to a safer neighbourhood. Such actions 
reduce the social and spatial proximity and accessibility of potential victims to 
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potential offenders, thus limiting the opportunities for the latter to commit crime 
against the former. As a result of the security and avoidance behaviour, which 
removes citizens from risk, following an increase, crime rates will reduce 
subsequently. Key parameters of such models will include, on the one hand, elasticity 
in the respective preferences for crime (on the part of offenders) and for security (on 
the part of victims), and, on the other hand, by the supply of crime-facilitating goods 
and services to offenders, and of security-producing goods and services to citizens. 
These are provided by ‘third parties’ of various kinds, including but by no means 
exclusively limited to the statutory agencies of criminal justice (Hope, 2006)8.  
 
The outcome, aggregate trend of reflexive securitization is likely to exhibit 
endogeneity since citizens’ avoidance and security behaviour is ‘learned’ from their 
direct and indirect knowledge of the actions of the offending population (however 
imperfect that knowledge might be). The crime victimisation rate is thus produced 
interactively and reflexively, albeit with actors operating with imperfect information9, 
and is more likely to take a non-linear rather than a linear form – including cyclical 
fluctuations of ‘boom-and-bust’. Again, since interactive ‘learning’ is incorporated 
into the model, it is likely that short-run changes will have more influence than long-
run trends and, possibly, that the influence of predictors will be asymmetric on the 
trend in burglary since immediate past experience may play a significant defining role 
in the next period, and so on. Thus, short of further endogenous ‘shocks’ to the 
system, the trend may develop longer-term entropy, giving only the appearance of a 
long-term, error-correcting trend10. In sum, it is possible that an elaboration of the 
theory of reflexive securitisation might provide the basis for a better model of the 
post-war burglary trend than hitherto, especially in its promise that it might more 
adequately account for the ‘boom-bust’ cyclical pattern that appears to have 
characterised the trend over the past twenty-five years.    
 
                                                 
8 For example, as suggested below in the case of domestic burglary, the loss-reduction interests of 
household insurers, or the marketing capacities of private security providers may be as much, if not 
more, influential in shaping the probability of victim-offender transactions as the role of public police 
(Hope, 2006). 
9 Imperfect information, of course, can result in citizens consuming more security than may be 
commensurate with their actuarial risk, and a greater offence failure rate for burglars.   
10 This interpretation is consistent with Deadman’s (2003) model, discussed above and that of Hale 
(1998), which identified a number of epochal step-changes in the post-war recorded crime trend. 
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Private security consumption 
 
One arm of the theory of reflexive securitization emphasises growth in private 
security. In terms of supply, the market for private security has grown extensively, 
with an almost five-fold increase in the turnover of British security equipment 
manufacturers between 1983 and 200311. The BCS also provides data periodically on 
individual and household private security consumption which now appears to exert a 
significant influence on the risk of burglary: for example, 82 per cent of the general 
population have window locks compared to only 38 per cent of burglary victims; 
while households that had experienced an attempted burglary also had higher security 
levels than those where a burglar had gained entry. (Dodd et al., 2004). In recent 
cross-sectional, multivariate models, home security protection and membership of 
Neighbourhood Watch (NW) schemes now appear as significant predictors of a lower 
likelihood of burglary and household theft (Tseloni, 2006; Walker et al., 2006), and 
this is a marked difference from models estimated on earlier sweeps of the BCS (cf. 
Ellingworth et al., 1997; Trickett et al., 1995b). The BCS also records considerable 
increases in home security consumption since the early-1990s (Simmons and Dodd, 
2003).  
 
Hope and Lab (2001) identified three distinct domains of private security behaviour 
relating to household and dwelling security crime prevention activity: In each case, 
respondents’ propensity to adopt a domain of private security behaviour reflected a 
combination of their experience or perception of crime victimisation risk and the 
resources available to them to facilitate the activity.  For each of the household 
security domains 12, respondents were more likely to: think they had a high likelihood 
of burglary; be burglary victims; live in high crime areas; and live in detached 
dwellings 13. Consistent with American research, a greater take-up of security was 
found amongst the more affluent: having higher incomes, educational levels and more 
                                                 
11 Information available from the British Security Industry Association. 
12 These were: Neighbourhood Watch (consisting of activities that relied upon assurance from risk 
including membership of a watch group, property-marking, informal neighbourly watching and 
household insurance); Technological Security (consisting of surveillance measures such as alarms and 
timer lights); and Fortress Security (consisting of physical resistance measures including locks, bolts, 
and bars) (Hope and Lab, 2001). 
13 A type of property identified in BCS data as at greater risk of burglary (Hope, 1999; 1984). 
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types of goods liable to theft; and being home owners, older and more likely to be 
married (Hope and Lab, 2001). Thus, while it would seem that the experience or 
threat of crime has encouraged a greater level of private security consumption, it 
would seem likely to have benefited most the better-off and more established 
members of society (Hope, 2001a; 2001b).  
 
Whereas NW might have been regarded once as a direct crime prevention measure, 
nowadays it tends to be regarded as having an indirect effect as a delivery mechanism 
for disseminating crime prevention information (Laycock and Tilley, 1994). From a 
set of models of BCS data, Hope and Trickett (2004) estimated that households’ 
participation in NW may be prompted by two ostensibly countervailing factors: on the 
one hand, a sense of risk and worry about crime; on the other hand, a sense of 
neighbourly reciprocity. Generally, high fear goes along with high risk and 
diminished community satisfaction and reciprocity but households’ actual 
participation in NW (as distinct from its availability) depends upon both perceived 
risk and actual resources being present. These resources are as much ‘social’ as they 
are economic. Interpreting these data, it is amongst the better-off sections and 
communities that these tendencies come together (Hope, 2000). While economic 
capital can purchase freedom from risk, few except the very rich have sufficient 
quantities to isolate themselves so completely that they do not need the security 
efforts of their neighbours. Yet there is a need to retain these efforts for the benefit of 
all residents of the neighbourhood. The additional, social capital of middle-class 
suburbs is to be found in their networks of weak, overlapping ties. The web of social 
reciprocity14 in middle-class suburbs not only indicates the availability of social 
capital – deriving from assured, trust relations - but also its capacity to be transformed 
into collective action. Such groups’ success in sustaining themselves - thus countering 
free-riding - is that continuing access to the benefits of belonging to the ‘security 
club’ depends not simply on residing in a conducive area of like-minded people but is 
also reinforced by the benefits accruing from membership or support of other 
community groups delivering social and cultural benefits. Thus, a key variable that 
differentiated the Neighbourhood Watch domain from the other household protection 
activities was whether the participant was also involved in other community social 
                                                 
14 Proxied here by BCS respondents’ perceptions of reciprocity amongst fellow residents (Hope and 
Trickett, 2004). 
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groups (Hope and Lab, 2001; see also Skogan, 1988). With the kinds of social 
sanctions available, members can trust that their fellow-members will continue to 
contribute to the collective generation of private security goods and that they will not 
free-ride (cf. Olson, 1971), thus undermining and diluting the efforts of those who do 
participate in private security production. 
 
The externality benefits produced by private security action in the exclusive suburb or 
urban enclave thus become a club good, retained for the benefit of the membership 
(Hope, 2000). The pooling of these benefits within a network of social capital is also 
likely to intensify their effects. Social capital leads to greater efficiency in the security 
accumulation process: social sanctions become less necessary the more exclusive the 
club since membership exclusivity ensures that the externalities of individual private 
security efforts will be retained within the club for the benefit of club-members only 
and will likewise not suffer from the threat of congestion and dilution of the club’s 
security goods from external parties wanting a share of the benefit. Generally, the 
price-mechanisms of the housing market tend to ensure that the more affluent suburbs 
are the most exclusive, usually through increased social and spatial ‘distance’ placed 
between themselves and the perceived sources of risk; membership exclusivity is 
preserved, and security remains undiluted, through insulating the club’s boundaries 
against encroachment (Hope, 1999). Fear of crime thus plays a socially productive 
role not only prompting security consumption but also stimulating and reinforcing it 
15. Economic resources affect entry to exclusive club goods and serve to ration 
security production, while the social capital resources accruing from club membership 
operate to intensify the investment. As such, private security consumption becomes 
enriched and, arguably, more effective as a deterrent: security externalities are 
preserved, while negative, criminogenic externalities are excluded. 
 
The theory of reflexive securitisation would seem a plausible way of linking burglary 
victimisation and private security trends 16. The residential clubbing and consequent 
intensification of private security, may affect mid-range communities the most: very 
                                                 
15 Ewald (2000) describes a productive role played by fear of crime in helping citizens of the former 
GDR adjust to the reunification of Germany. 
16 Declining rates of burglary seem now to be the norm across the western advanced economies, and 
have been in long-term decline in the United States since the mid-1970s, accompanied in many cases 
by increasing private security consumption (van Dijk, 2006). 
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low crime communities have an excess of community over risk, and thus an excess of 
immunity; their investment in private security may be primarily symbolic. In contrast, 
high crime neighbourhoods have an excess of victimisation (Figure 2), which 
negatively affects trust and social capital formation (Skogan, 1988). Only perhaps 
where countervailing forces of immunity and victimisation are in ‘constructive’ 
tension are security club goods likely to be generated (Hope, 1988). Transformations 
in the housing market – particularly counter-urbanisation, an increasing 
exclusivisation of suburbs and an urban enclavisation - may all have had the latent 
effect of insulating boundaries to preserve security goods and repel outsiders (Hope, 
1999). Rather than a concentration of crime and poverty, the reduction may indicate 
the secession of the successful from burglary risk, resulting in a polarisation of 
residential risk between rich and poor (Hope, 2001). This may help to explain an 
apparent paradox uncovered in Field’s original model: that increases in the proportion 
of households in owner occupation were found to be inversely related to growth in 
recorded residential burglary during the following year (Field, 1990: 47). In other 
words, some part of the decline in burglary may have been introduced asymmetrically 
into the trend by the socio-spatial distancing between victims and offenders brought 
about by the changing ecology of tenure in the UK over the period (Hope, 1999; 
2001). Thus, reflexive securitization may explain why the bulk of burglary reduction 
has come about through a reduction in prevalence, since a large number of erstwhile 
victims may have been removed from risk, and thus would be eligible no longer for 
selection as repeat or multiple victims.  
 
Public versus Private Action 
 
If the reduction in burglary has been brought about largely through reflexive 
securitisation, to what extent can this be attributed directly to the crime prevention 
policies of government? In the first place, it has always been notoriously difficult with 
non-experimental data to isolate the effect of governmental crime prevention 
publicity, and recent efforts (e.g. Bowers and Johnson, 2003) are plagued with 
methodological error (Hope, 2004). Second, drawing upon the results of a thorough 
evaluation of local burglary prevention projects run by statutory partnership agencies, 
the likelihood appears slim of governmental action having a direct reductive effect on 
burglary risk, at least following current practices (Hope et al., 2004). In a recent paper 
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(Hope, 2006), I have described, in qualitative theory, some of the possible 
components and interactions of a reflexive, interactive model of burglary, focussing 
particularly upon the influences shaping the individual citizen’s (non-offender’s) side 
of the equation. In broad terms these comprise: on the one hand, those resources and 
incentives available for security and protection derived from governmental action, 
provided by virtue of citizenship; on the other hand, those resources and incentives 
available from the private sector or civil society, obtainable either by individual 
private contract or informal collective agreement. The alternative possibility, then, is 
that burglary has reduced since the mid-1990s due to private security consumption, 
reinforced by the loss reduction policies of the British insurance industry. 
 
Considerations of Loss 
 
The consideration of loss is a significant driver of the official recorded burglary rate, 
and indicative of the impact of the private security-insurance nexus on burglary. It has 
been claimed that the rise in official, recorded burglary during the 1970s was driven 
primarily by increased insurance claiming, which in turn was driven by growth in the 
number of private household contents insurance policies, irrespective of any growth in 
the underlying level of burglary, which remained unmeasured in the absence of a 
national crime victimisation survey for the period (Litton and Pease, 1984).  As a 
consequence of their interest in loss reduction, insurers typically require victims to 
report the offence for which a claim is sought - this would seem to be a measure 
aimed chiefly at the victim, as a deterrent for fraudulent claiming (the investigation of 
which would otherwise cost insurers more in loss adjustment). The police have always 
acquiesced with this requirement. Although there is no legal obligation for them to 
comply, it would seem prudent for the police to record allegations of burglary with 
loss, since otherwise the enquiries of insurers would risk uncovering police non-
compliance in crime recording. Considerations of insurance claiming remain a major 
determinant of victims’ propensity to report burglary, and of the police propensity to 
record it as an offence:  78 per cent of BCS burglaries with loss are reported to the 
police, with 98 per cent of these recorded by the police (Table 2); while only 49 per 
cent of attempts and no loss burglaries are reported to the police, with merely 44 per 
cent of these recorded by the police (Table 3).  In effect, then, the insurance industry 
has been able to secure a subsidy from the public police that reinforces its loss 
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reduction interest and reduces its costs of loss adjustment, including fraudulent 
claiming. The consequence of this policy is an inflated recorded burglary rate17.  
 
Tables 2 and 3 about here 
 
The impact of this loss reduction policy can be inferred from an analysis of the 
changing composition of burglary reported to, and recorded by, the police18. 
Previously, it has been inferred that the changing composition of with loss burglary 
indicates an increase in the offence failure rate (Table 1). Tables 2 and 3 give an idea 
of how loss, victim reporting and police recording may have interacted over the 
period. Particularly for burglary involving loss, in the first period (1981-1991), 
victim’s propensity to report burglary to the police increased yet this was matched by 
a reduction in the police propensity to record with loss burglary offences reported to 
them. Conversely, in the second period (1991-2003/04), the public’s propensity to 
report with-loss burglaries declined, while the police propensity to record such 
offences reported to them increased. It is tempting to interpret these interactions as 
indications of how considerations of loss affect the recorded crime rate19: in the first 
period, victims’ propensity to report burglary increased when With-loss burglary was 
also increasing, presumably reflecting a greater take-up of insurance, and its 
associated loss-reduction requirements; in the second period, since victims’ 
propensity to report with-loss burglary declined at the same time as with-loss burglary 
as a whole was declining suggests, perhaps, a greater likelihood of victims consuming 
less household insurance (because of a diminishing risk), or claiming less (perhaps 
because of an increase in insurers’ premiums and deductibles, and the cost of their 
remedial security requirements).  
 
In contrast, changes in police recording propensity may reflect adjustments to 
workload in the face of changing public demand: in the first period, the police may 
have been ‘cuffing’ (i.e. deliberately not recording) proportionately more of the 
increasing amount of burglary reported to them (notwithstanding the insurers’ loss 
                                                 
17 For example, residential burglary comprises 7 per cent of BCS crime but 12 per cent of the 
comparable basket of recorded crime (Walker et al., 2006). 
18 The advent of the British Crime Survey has afforded this opportunity. 
19 A much less marked, though essentially similar pattern is followed with respect to Attempted 
Burglary (Table 3) 
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adjusting requirement) in an effort to manage their workload and to deflate the rising 
recorded crime rate, which would reflect badly upon them and the government 20. In 
the second period, in the relative security of a decline in the underlying rate of 
burglary, the police can afford to record proportionately more of the burglary reported 
to them. That they have changed their recording propensity may have been due also to 
the increased pressure upon them: it is possible that the insurers have tightened-up 
their loss adjustment practice; and it is clear that the Government’s introduction of the 
National Crime Recording Standard in 2000, and the associated external auditing 
which has gone with it (Matrix and Hope, 2006), may have given the police less scope 
to cuff crime than hitherto – indeed, nowadays the police record virtually all the with-
loss burglary reported to them (Table 2)21. 
 
Conclusion 
 
As a result of a conjunction of interests between private sector loss reduction and 
public sector crime prevention, it would seem that the ‘market’ for burglary in 
England and Wales, and its resulting aggregate outcome, is now shaped by a mutual 
interest amongst the main third parties to the victimisation event. Both insurers, 
private security suppliers and government have an interest in stimulating the 
consumption of private security (Hope, 2006); and it is only rational that citizens 
should comply, regardless of whether this might result in their over-consumption of 
private security, the increased profits of the providers of private security, who benefit 
from the inelasticity of demand induced by consumer insecurity, or the electoral 
fortunes of Government in taking the credit. It is a matter of governance as to whether 
it is right or justifiable for Government, and its police service, to claim responsibility 
for bringing down burglary. But it is a matter of public probity if counterfactual 
evidence remains unexamined, or worse, distorted or suppressed (see Hope, 2004). 
Yet, the win-win situation in which all the main third parties conspire militates against 
close examination and, to that extent, the remarkable drop in burglary may remain, at 
least in England and Wales, largely a mystery. 
 
                                                 
20 Although the recorded crime rate still spiked dramatically in 1990-1992. 
21 Of course, we cannot predict whether this would continue were there to be a rise in the underlying 
burglary rate. 
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Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
Source: Dhiri  et al. (1999) Figure 5.
Home Office forecast, 1998-2001 
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Figure 2 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Walker et al. (2006), Figure 6.2 
 
Reduction:  
40% recorded burglary, 1998 – 2006; 
58% BCS burglary, 1997-2006 
 20 
Figure 3 
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Figure 4 
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Table 1 
 
Domestic Burglary in England and Wales, 1981-1991, and 1991-2003/04: with 
loss, reported to police, recorded by police – proportions, and percentage 
changes in proportions 
 
BCS 
burglary 
1981 1991 2003-04   
1981/91 
 
1991/2003-
04 
With loss .498 .516 .442 3.6 - 14.3 
Attempted 
(no entry, 
no loss) 
.368 .370 .435 -0.5 18.2 
 
Source: British Crime Survey. Dodd et al., 2004. 
 
Table 2 
 
With loss Domestic Burglary in England and Wales, 1981-1991, and 1991-
2003/04: reported to police, recorded by police – proportions, and percentage 
changes in proportions 
 
 
With loss 
BCS 
Burglary 
1981 1991 2003-04   
1981/91 
 
1991/2003-
04 
Reported to 
police as a 
proportion 
of all BCS 
burglary 
with loss 
.847 .921 .779 7.4 -15.4 
Recorded 
by police as 
a proportion 
of reported 
.870 .744 .982 - 14.5 23.8 
 
Source: Dodd et al., 2004 
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Table 3 
 
Attempts and No Loss Domestic Burglary in England and Wales, 1981-1991, and 
1991-2003/04: reported to police, recorded by police - percentages 
 
Attempts 
and No 
Loss BCS 
Burglary 
1981 1991 2003-04   
1981/91 
 
1991/2003-
04 
Reported to 
police as a 
proportion 
of all BCS 
attempted 
and no loss 
burglary  
.484 .530 .485 9.5 -8.5 
Recorded 
by police as 
a proportion 
of reported 
.401 .410 .439 2.2 7.07 
  
Source: Dodd et al., 2004
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